Archive for May, 2016

“The [Egyptian] citizenship law category consternation just described echoes the confusion of European-trained census takers who worked to measure the Egyptian population in the late nineteenth century. … In a sense, the malleable landscape of nationalities reflected in
these censuses appears a category game, in which the population was reclassified by different criteria each decade. As we will see in the next section,
however, nationality was anything but an abstraction: in the complex legal
landscape of turn-of-the-century Egypt, nationality determined jurisdiction
over the bodies of the territory’s subjects.  The confounding incoherence
of nationality categories in the Egyptian census shows that in a system of
overlapping sovereignty, identification is performative. Egyptians and Otto-
mans were labeled not for their own needs – the labels entailed no access
to rights – but for presentation to their imperial administrators. Like
nationality law, the census provides only unsteady ground for the study of
Ottoman-Egyptian citizenship.

The 1882 census was hardly the first to categorize Egypt’s population
by national type. The 1800 Description de l’Egypte described eight groups:
Egyptians, Turks, Arabs, Moors (specifically, Maghrabis), Greeks, Syrians,
Jews, and Europeans. The 1840 census divided the population between those under local authority (dakhil al-hukuma) and those beyond government authority (kharij al-hukuma).  A contemporary study of the 1855
cholera epidemic differentiated between eleven categories: Europeans,
Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, Copts, Israelites, Natives, Turks, Maghrabis,
Barbaris, and Blacks.  

The 1882 census employed a new hierarchy of three major categories
(settled native, nomad, and foreigner), each of which was subdivided into
minor categories. The decennial censuses of 1897, 1907, and 1917 reduced
the decisive split to foreign and local. Local subjects (as opposed to foreigners) were subdivided in the four censuses in question… 

…four main groups adulterat[ed] a vision of a purely
Egyptian local population: Ottomans, Bedouins, Sudanese, and local subjects of European origin (such as Greeks). The 1897 census divided the local
population much as the one in 1882, but Sudanese were dropped, and the
divide between settled and nomadic Egyptians was set aside. Sedentary,
Bedouin, and Ottoman were all clearly labeled as “real” Egyptians. In 1907,
Sudanese reappeared, and certain Ottomans were divided into four “local”
nations. The 1907 census was the first since the inchoate Egyptian nationality law of 1900. Perhaps as a result, Ottomans appeared for the first time
as foreigners. Subdivision was extended ten years later: Egyptians were
distinguished according to sect, and four new miscellaneous population
categories were added. But only now, once it was divided in a dozen ways,
did “local” emerge as a distinct, collective category given a cumulative population figure of its own. In previous years, census makers offered an aggregate total of foreigners but never of local subjects. 

From the time of the 1882 census, settlement was the hallmark of a
national population; Bedouins and foreigners were anomalous because they
were mobile. Although the desert and sea hinterlands of the Nile valley
were sites of problematic flux, “real” Egyptians were suitable f(n· counting
because they were tied to the land and isolated from other nations. Turkish
and Syrian immigration had slowed, and Europeans were now the principal
immigrant group. Their “distinct social and political behaviour (al-mukhtalijiyin mashraban/situation sociale et politique apart) prevent[ed]
them being confused with the native population (zummt al-wataniyin),”
which was agrarian and sedentary. The census makers claimed that this
distinction was “social and political”; in reality, it was jurisdictional. Bedouins and foreigners were considered separately because they were exempt from the laws that governed other subjects. The distinction between real
Egyptians and all others made operative sense in terms of 1880s domestic
policy, according to which dangerous Bedouins were to be taken under
government control, foreigners were to be protected, and settled natives
were to be taxed. 

Nonstandard subjects were deficient subjects, and they tarnished the
census project. In an opening apologia, the authors of the 1882 census
distinguished their work, which only measured de facto population, from
the study of resident population that a proper European state required.
Only the systematization of civil status would make such a project possible
in Egypt. In other words, something like “indigenous nationality” had to
be clearly defined if Egypt was to join the community of nations. Subsequent censuses track the progress of this project. By 1917, a full range of
local nationalities joined the foreign diversity previously on display. It is
no surprise that census counts of national groups in Alexandria were as
inconsistent as the categories themselves. Although the overall population
of the city increased steadily from census to census to census, the share
assigned to each group fell and rose and rose and fell. 

Faced with these unwieldy categories, social historians are as otibalance
as the legal scholars cited in the previous section. Daniel Panzac has produced several studies of the population of nineteenth-century Egypt in
which he displays careful critical faculties. His suspicion of uneven growth
rates, for instance, leads him to a radical departure from census figures of
Egypt’s aggregate population.  But where nationality is concerned, his
work is in the thrall of the census and its categories and content to trace a
smooth growth rate for the foreign population, ignoring the fact that Ottomans appear and disappear from the census figures. Other studies of the
censuses avoid this trap, but their critical approach toward statistics rarely
extends to the categories employed.  This remarkable omission manifests
the allure of dividing population into singular nationalities that seem to
possess some inherent validity discouraging critical probing. 

Three pieces of evidence call into question the national categories of
identity used by census takers: the changing stock of categories used; the
inconsistent statistics that they produced; and the calculated, nuanced performances that court documents demonstrate lay behind most black-and-white claims to nationality. Census
makers certainly witnessed the same genre of performance on polling day.
Little is known of the details of their data collection.”

– Will Hanley, “When Did Egyptians Stop Being Ottomans? An Imperial Citizenship Case Study.” in Willem Maas (ed.), Multilevel Citizenship. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. pp. 89-109.

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May 28, 2016: a new episode of The Anatomy Lesson at 11pm EST on CFRC 101.9 FM (cfrcradio). Music by craow, Paper Eyes (early Gavin Russom), R U REAL, Devours, mohammadsound, a rare Natural Snow Buildings album, and releases (like E-Saggila) from the Summer Isle, maleactivity, aughtvoid and totalblack labels. It’s Drone Day (http://droneday.org/) by the way. Tune in at 101.9 FM, stream at http://audio.cfrc.ca:8000/listen.pls or download the finished show at cfrc.ca.

Devours – “Cryptkeeper” Late Bloomer
Craow – “Dark” Craow
Paper Eyes – “Ghosts (Version 1)” Source Cognitive Drive: Transmissions, 1996-1998
E-Saggila – “Formed By Clay” Devotion (2015)
Oil Thief – “The Frontier” In The Heat
B.P. – “Torso of Balance, 1975” Red Poinsettias Placed Alongside Your Memento Chest

R U Real – “No need to talk” Throwing Fries
Jesuve – “II” Poetics (2014)
Mohammad – “Sakrifis” Som Sakrifis (2013)
Natural Snow Buildings – “Solomon” The Ladder (2015)
Cloaked Figure – “If You Close Your Eyes You Lose the Power of Abstration” Tome is Melting

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“But if Speenhamland had problems, shouldn’t Polanyi have liked the market society that came after?

He didn’t like either, for reasons that are connected to his second, equally important argument: that the move to markets is inherently destabilizing. Rather than a font of liberty and freedom, markets are also a source of coercion, instability, precarity, and worse. Subjecting all of life to the market wouldn’t result in the freest society but instead one defined by the collapse of social life.

As Polanyi writes:

To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment … would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity “labor power” cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused without affecting the human being who happens to be [its] bearer.
… In disposing of a man’s labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity “man” attached to the tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure [and] social dislocation… . Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled,
… the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts were in primitive society.

Polanyi says that a market society is impossible to achieve, in any case, because people resist being turned into commodities. When they are exposed to too much of the market—when markets try to “disembed” from society—people resist, demanding protection from excessive commodification. Lives are more than commodities for those who are living them. This is what Polanyi describes as the “double movement”—the drive for laissez-faire inevitably produces a protective countermovement that insists on shelter from the damaging effects of the market. Welfare and different forms of social insurance are canonical products of this resistance; Polanyi believed fascism was another possible response.

Polanyi’s been dead quite a while. Can he really help explain today’s economy?

Yes. There’s been a focus in academic literature on a stage of capitalism described as “neoliberalism.” In one story, neoliberalism is an elite reaction to the economic crises of the 1970s, one that resulted in a wholesale change in the way markets were structured. Lower taxes, global capital mobility, fewer regulations, the weakening of unions, the abandonment of full employment policies and a move away from the Keynesian framework that governed the midcentury period are all characteristic of this story.

What puts the “neo” in neoliberalism is the view that this was meant to be an explicit project of the state to ensure markets worked this way in a way Polanyi would understand.

Recent research has shown that the way the economy is situated has been one of the major drivers in the growth of inequality since 1980: the rules matter. Financial deregulation drove the doubling of the share of finance workers in the top 1 percent. There was a major shift in the compensation of CEOs during this time, one that went with an engineered shareholder revolution that changed the nature of whom the firm works for. High marginal tax rates were cut, which led to skyrocketing high-end incomes. The resulting higher capital income from deregulation and weaker worker power is one of the main drivers of inequality.

Some might argue that there is nothing to be done about all this. According to a libertarian way of thinking, the product of the market is just while taxes are a form of theft. The pre-tax distribution of income is fair, while the post-tax one is the result of government “interference” in the economy. But to a Polanyian, this is nonsense, because the pre-tax distribution of income is just as much a product of social and political institutions as is the post-tax distribution. States don’t interfere with markets—they create them. That doesn’t mean that all markets are bad, and Polanyi never imagined that they would all end. It just means that if markets are interfering with other social priorities (like democracy, for example), or producing bad outcomes, you can change the rules that govern what parts of society operate with what kinds of markets.

Polanyi might also point out that even when the market is supposed to be “natural” and self-sustaining, states need to step in to ensure that they work. This was clearly the case in the financial crisis, when the financial markets imploded rapidly, putting the entire payments system and healthy firms at major risk. But it’s also clear in the European Union. The central bank controlling the euro took specific actions to drive Spain and Italy into market chaos to force austerity and neoliberal reforms. This didn’t simply happen on its own; the state had to intervene through markets.”

– Patrick Iber and Mike Konczal, “Karl Polanyi for President.Dissent Magazine, May 23, 2016.

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“Ironically, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the Veiled Protectorate that followed did much to bolster notions of Egypt’s national
independence. During the early years of the occupation, the situation of
Egypt vis-a-vis the British and Ottoman Empires was characterized by two
fictions. Public discourse pretended that the Ottomans retained a measure
of control over Egypt and that Egypt retained a measure of independence
from Britain. In official correspondence, Egypt was carefully and consistently referred to as al-qutr al-misri, the “Egyptian region.” It was also
referred to with safe synonyms for “region,” such as tarafand diyar. In
the interests of pragmatism, oppositional political strategy was structured
around opposition to British imperial control. The nationalist discourse
that emerged in the 1890s appeared to instrumentalize (or even marginalize) Ottomanism in order to address the BritishY Nevertheless, it seems
that the Veiled Protectorate instilled its narrative of light, almost imperceptible rule successfully: Britain’s influence over Egypt’s citizens is obscured
in historical memory.

Although Britain drew most nationalist political fire, the Ottoman
Empire remained the key referent for Egypt’s elite political and intellectual
culture, even as late as the turn ofthe century. Egyptians were active observers of, and indeed participants in, the Ottoman reform movements of the
early twentieth century. Egypt is often portrayed as a site of exile for Young
Turks, but it was not merely an inert foreign land. Just as the United
States of America remained (and remains) in the cultural, economic, and
indeed political sphere of the British empire long after independence, so
too did Egypt remain part of the Ottoman commonwealth. This commonwealth was most visible in the writings of a small intelligentsia. The Ottoman Empire experienced a brief episode of constitutionalism and limited
representative government in 1876 and another starting in 1908. Egypt,
meanwhile, had no constitution or elections until the 1920s. Government
was for bureaucrats, not citizens, and political discourse was the realm of
journalists and a handful of elite activists.

A whole literature endeavors to define Ottomanism, and it is by no
means unusual that this elusive label should fail to fit Egyptians exactly. Ottoman citizenship, the central concern of this chapter, had its first legal
articulation in 1869.  The idea of citizenship was foreign to the nineteenth-
century Ottoman Empire; the great Egyptian chronicler of Napoleon’s 1798
invasion merely transliterated the term: sitwayan. The Arabic jinsiya (related to “genus”) came to designate “nationality.” Even the neologism for
national citizen (muwatin) does not designate the rights-bearing liberal
subject of a certain vision of Western citizenship. Subjecthood, on the other
hand, has a more stable Arabic and Ottoman vocabulary, in common usage
during the nineteenth century. The Arabic/Ottoman term tab’iyat/tabiiyet
derives from tabi’/tabii, meaning subject (of a state or sovereign). But the
truly stable term is the eighth-century reaya, for “flock” or “subjects.”

The relationship of shepherd (the Ottoman sultan) and flock (his subjects) was based on protection and loyalty rather than sovereignty and allegiance. This tie was bolstered by the sultan’s role as caliph, or earthly head
of the Islamic commtmity. Even when his secular powers were limited, the
Ottoman sultan maintained spiritual dominion, to which Egypt signaled its
symbolic loyalty. The province was given the right to mint its own currency
in 1834 (a mark of monetary autonomy), but this token of independence
bore the sultan-caliph’s name (his tugra) until 1914. The same name was
invoked at Friday prayers throughout this period. On this basis, more
recent scholarship argues that as late as 1905, “in the final analysis, the
majority of Egyptians considered themselves to be Ottoman subjects,” and
those interested in forging an independent Egypt pursued a policy of de-Ottomanization as a result. Ottoman wars were increasingly defined as
Islamic, and enthusiastic moral and material support from Egyptians during the Italo-Turkish war over Libya (1911-1912) were the last great sign
of Egypt’s Ottoman affiliation. The fact remains, however, that the sultan’s
direct control over his Egyptian flock was definitively supplanted by his
own governor during the 1830s. After that point, Ottoman sovereignty was
reduced to suzerainty and symbolic payment of tribute; no more Egyptian
troops fought Ottoman wars.

If the sultan retained only spiritual and symbolic authority over his
Egyptian subjects, his nominal subalterns enhanced direct sovereignty at
the provincial level. The upstart governor Mehmet Ali and his descendants
used the techniques of modern control to extract ever more military, agricultural, and public works labor from Egyptians. The debt crisis of the
1870s and British occupation of the 1880s transferred much of this dominion to the European comptrollers who directed the Egyptian economy. The
Egyptian state, ftguratively controlled by the Ottomans and literally controlled by the British, communicated with its subjects through its officials.
These agents of the “local government”- tax collectors, police, and local
headmen – articulated economic, legal, and military subjecthood at the
local level.”

– Will Hanley, “When Did Egyptians Stop Being Ottomans?
An Imperial Citizenship Case Study.” in Willem Maas (ed.), Multilevel Citizenship. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. pp. 89-109.

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lsie Larson & June Vlasek. Publicity still for Fox; Malibu, California; May 25, 1933.

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‘“Our Spirit.” A Modern Ottoman Interpretation of Ottoman History’

“In order to
be able to govern a community well, it is necessary to have
understood it; in order to understand it, it Is necessary to know its
spirit. I take it that up to the present our spirit has not been
analyzed. This is a very broad subject for investigation. As a brief
introduction to it, I offer this rough draft of an essay.

"This is
certain : we belong to a people originally nomad shepherds. For
example, like the primitive Germans, the property of our ancestors
consisted in flocks. Being under the necessitiy of searching for
pasture, they had no permanent centers of life. They were satisfied
with a camp instead of a house, and in the place of heavy household
effects, they contented themselves with huge saddle bags and meager
supplies which were easy to transport. In this way they passed on to
us the instinct to go lightly laden. It can be said that even to-day
you will not find a Turkish home without its travel boxes.

ancestors, like well trained shepherds, were dexterous, devout,
imaginative, and openhearted. Because they managed flocks that were
always obedient to them, they became accustomed to authority. It is a
well-accepted sociological principle that the customs of ancestors
consti- tute the most important of the factors which determine
character. The fact that our ancestors were accustomed to authority
has created in us a ‘tendency to tyranny.’ I remember a saying which
I used to hear frequently twenty or twenty-five years ago: ‘An Abdul
Hamid burns in the spirit of every one of us.’ And we see every day
that those who reach places of authority among us act somewhat like
shepherds, and treat the people somewhat as if they were a flock of
sheep. I have not yet seen in our country a government which, except
under pressure and necessity, challenges thought, explains its
policies, and calls for an expression of popular will from us in one
way or another, as if we were men. When the subject is looked at in
this light, the yoke of the past appears to hang on our necks with
all its burdensomeness.

"Neither the
palace nor the Divan at any time demanded thought, shrewdness, and
intelligence from the people. Their sole and perpetual demand was
obedience. They expected from us immeasurable, unending, and
universal tractability. This constant obedience has become a very bad
mold for our spirit. In our most liberal judgments a form of
servitude can be detected. Our minds cannot draw a deep intellectual
breath; and our intellects are not commensurate with the liberty
demanded by our hearts.

"If you look
closely, our history is six centuries of tyranny. The pyramid of
government from top to bottom was an apparatus of oppression. It
quite flattened out the Turkish soul whose exaltation was its holy
task. Every official stamp is a pollution of the spirit of the
people. Our feelings with reference to the rulers of our affairs can
be summarized in a few words: the state of being cowed. We recall
that one name of a subject was ‘slave.’ In reality, bad government
has stamped us a little with the spirit of the slave. We were
accustomed to mistrust and deception and, although outwardly pleased
with the government, at the bottom of our hearts we were critical.
Our historians are interpreters of popular sensibilities: ‘Under a
layer of deceit a deep ocean of contempt,’ they say.

"Upon these
original endowments there were grafted on to our spirits in
succession three civilizations: the Seljuk, the Moslem, and the
Byzantine. The Seljuks had brought to Western Asia the civilization
of the Persians with whom they had been in contact for a century and
a half. In their life and art there was a strange Persian flavor.
They spoke Turkish but they wrote Persian. Among the Seljuks as among
the Persians, Islam had assumed the form of mysticism.

Bey and our ancestors who were with him naturally were influenced by
this Seljukian civilization which was originally Persian. Thinking it
poor and contemptible, they did not deem the language which they had
brought with them from Central Asia suitable for official
correspondence and for literature. Our language was left open to
Persian words without rule or limitation. Along with Persian thought
and literature a tendency to emphasize details had its influence on
our spirit. We lost the power to master the general form of the
intellectual and artistic aspects of our life, as a shepherd surveys
a landscape. Our minds were seeking both beauty and truth in elements
and details.

"Our poets,
disregarding the thought structure of a poem, exhibited diffused and
disordered art in its couplets and hemistichs. Structural beauty was
sought, not in the general make-up of our buildings but in their
interior designs and detailed ornamentation. The beauty of our music
also was found in simple melodies rather than in the harmonious
movements of music. In painting, even, principles of art inspired by
Persia were prevalent. There was no science of perspective; there
were no rules of arrangement; there was no eloquence of exposition;
the only beauty held in honor was that of very fine lines and

"On the
other hand, the influence of Moslem culture began to be felt in court
and sanctuary. Our vocabulary was thrown open to Arabic words for the
sake of law and religion. Our intellect remained under the discipline
of Arab learning.

"After we
entered Constantinople we found ourselves in contact with Byzantine
civilization. The Byzantine legacy was a mixture of good and evil.
For example, on the one hand, well-filled libraries, advanced fine
arts, lofty sages, and wise historians were found. On the other hand,
superstitions, lethargy, superficial culture, a paper government,
moral indulgence that was open to criticism, bribery, legal delays,
the arrest of justice because of hair-splitting distinctions.

Persian, nor Arab, nor Byzantine civilization was suited to our
character. For in our minds there is no great aptitude for minute
philosophizing like the Persians, nor for fine analysis like the
Arabs, nor for devotion to aesthetics like the Byzantines. The Turks
are an active folk. Like the English and the Romans they could excel
in the field of activity and achievement. In our veins there was a
wealth of life. This ought to have been discovered and directed
toward fruitful efforts. Bewildering success was promised to the Turk
in agriculture, commerce, and industry on land and sea. The object of
our attention ought to have been science and art, especially their
practical aspects. Our old leaders misunderstood progress. They
fancied that a far-flung kingdom of territory would assure general
happiness. They dissipated the life of the nation in ceaseless

"Our worthy
religion suited as it is to every type of worldly progress, every
development, and every phase of evolution in the hands of extremely
conservative men suspicious beyond reason, became, so to speak, a
thickened and congealed social factor. We could not sufficiently
realize the comfort arising from the breath of civilization which
fills Islam. Some forbidden things were emphasized in an excessive
degree, and some lawful things were abused. For example, on the one
hand women were imprisoned in ignorance and blindness, on the other
hand decorated dungeons, consisting of fifty or sixty rooms, were
opened for women under the name of Pashas’ harems. The one was abuse
of the veil, the other was abuse of concubinage.

"We have
heaped upon the path of our history a mass of the ruins of things
that have vanished. We ought to have bound these together in a
unified system; we could have done this by the grace of Islam. We did
not do it. Our countrymen have lacked cohesion. This land of ours has
been too early stopped up with a mass of the sediment of division. We
left to other elements duties which were suited to the native ability
of the Turk. We allowed the Turk to become intoxicated with his
political supremacy, and we yielded to the flaccidity of Byzantium.
The faithful and persistent Turk grew laxer and laxer.

"If the Turk
had received an historical training suited to his temperament, like
the English, he would have been a model of persistence and
perseverance, and he would have been as devoted to national
traditions. Our ancestors followed a single purpose for centuries
without faltering. Today any movement which continues for a few
months shakes us like a disease. Afterwards giving way to some other
movement,it disappears. I can assert that every movement among us
grows old before it reaches maturity and leaves no trace in its path.

national traits are, in a word, negative. Living in the present we do
not really master the present, let alone live through the past. For
every one of us history begins with his swaddling clothes and ends
with his tomb. We are not subject, as it were, to time and place.
Sons destroy what their fathers built, and no one thinks about the
founding of a spiritual structure which shall be the dwelling place
of conscience for our race. At the same time all of us imagine that
we are laying foundations, and what we call a foundation is such a
house of cards as is built in the morning but torn down by the wind
in the evening.

connection with the past is this only: we bear the torture of our
long line of forefathers. We have no definite plan based on the
experience of history. Once in a while in our political actions,
well-thought-out phases appear but you never see a phase tested by
life. If you probe a little into our administrative policies that
seem most fundamental, you will find their roots suspended in
emptiness; as if the freedom that is necessary for administration is
to be found in such emptiness.

the spirit of the Turk has received an historical training which has
overwhelmed his character, because of the mass of ruins with which he
has come in contact. We have wanted without selection to make use of
the products of civilization which have come to our hands. The spirit of the
Turk has been urged on in directions contrary to its capacity.

aspects of our nature have not been allowed to develop. We have been
able to exhibit a puny, hybrid civilization. If we had followed a
line of development congenial to our original endowments, the social
calamities which we have experienced would have been each one a
lesson in regeneration, and our life in general would have become a
line of shrewd progress. What use is it that the fine dough which
makes up the spirit of the Turk has been kneaded by unskillful

– Jenab Shehabeddin Bey, Professor of the Turkish Language and Literature in the University of Stamboul. “Our Spirit.” Peyam-Sabah {Morning News), January 31, 1921.

– from Clarence Richard Johnson, ed., Constantinople to-day; or, The pathfinder survey of Constantinople; a study in oriental social life.  New York: MacMillan Company, 1922. pp. 57-62

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May 21, 2016: a new episode of The Anatomy Lesson at 11pm EST on CFRC 101.9 FM @cfrcradio . Somehow this came together after a very long work week. Music from new collaborations by: Ilyas Ahmed & Golden Retriever (playing as Dreamboat), YlangYlang & Celine bion and a re-issue of Robert Turman & Aaron Dilloway. Also new music by Sarah Davachi, Accident du Travail, Ada Vale, Sphyxion, and a rediscovered live Cybotron track. Tune in at 101.9 FM, stream at http://audio.cfrc.ca:8000/listen.pls or download the finished show at cfrc.ca.

Body of Intrigue – “Vie Apres La Mort” ‘Decadence’
Sphyxion – “Sphyxion06” Sphyxion
YlangYlang & Celine Bion – “Golden Ratio” Split with Inner Travels
Comunión y Liberación – “La Fuente de Sangre” comunión y liberación (2015)
Sarah Davachi – “Feeler” Dominions
Accident du Travail – “Queen’s Funeral” trés prècieux sang
Robert Truman & Aaron Dilloway – “Untitled” Blizzard (2009)
Dreamboat – “Mirrored Image” Dreamboat
Ada Vale – “Ten Bird Road” & Motion
Cybotron – “Ride To Infinity” Sunday Night At The Total Theatre (1976)

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