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Scenes from the pro-FLN / Algerian independence demonstration and police massacre of October 17, 1961, in Paris.

From top to bottom:

1) TO GO WITH AFP STORY BY AMER OUALI(FILES): Picture taken on October 17, 1961 in Puteaux, outside Paris, shows demonstrators with their hands on their heads, arrested during a march gathering between 20,000 and 30,000 pro-Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) Algerians, and guarded by policemen outside a police station. French police, under orders from the head of the Parisian police, Maurice Papon, attacked the illegal but peaceful demonstration.

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Paris, FRANCE: (FILES) This file picture taken 17 October 1961 in Paris shows Algerian emigrants holding their hands on their heads in a bus after they were arrested by French police during a brutal police crackdown where dozens of Algerian protesters — some witnesses spoke of 200 — were killed by police.

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Des Algériens arrêtés lors de la manifestation pacifique, organisée à Paris le 17 octobre 1961 pendant la guerre d’Algérie par la Fédération de France du FLN (Front de Libération nationale) pour protester contre le couvre-feu imposé aux Français musulmans par le préfet de police Maurice Papon, sont emmenés par la police à bord de cars et d’autobus en direction des centres de tri, à Vincennes, au Palais des Sports ou au stade de Coubertin. Les quelque vingt mille manifestants – hommes, femmes et enfants – qui demandaient également la fin des hostilités et l’indépendance, furent victimes d’une répression violente les 17, 18, 19 et 20 octobre qui fit de nombreux morts 

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Des Parisiens regardent des vêtements abandonnés par des Algériens dans la bousculade due à l’intervention de la police contre la manifestation pacifique organisée à Paris le 17 octobre 1961.

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Photo prise en octobre 1961 des cars de police ayant escorté les bus qui ont emmené des Algériens arrêtés lors de la manifestation pacifique, organisée à Paris le 17 octobre 1961, au centre de tri du Palais des Sports. 

6)

Photo prise en octobre 1961 des cars de police ayant escorté les bus qui ont emmené des Algériens arrêtés lors de la manifestation pacifique, organisée à Paris le 17 octobre 1961, au centre de tri du Palais des Sports.

Source.

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Scenes from the pro-FLN / Algerian independence demonstration and police massacre of October 17, 1961, in Paris.

From top to bottom: 

1)

Manifestation des travailleurs algériens. Paris, 17 octobre 1961. Roger-Viollet

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17 octobre 1961. Métro Concorde. Elie Kagan/Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine

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17 octobre 1961. Nanterre, rue des Pâquerettes. Elie Kagan/Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine

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17 octobre 1961. Près du pont de Neuilly, camions de police. Elie Kagan/Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine

Source.

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Pierre Gaudard,

May 1, Montreal, Quebec. Gelatin silver print photograph, 1970. Canadian Photography Institute, National Gallery of Canada.

Purchased 1971. Accession number:

71-2165.  

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Barry Philp, “[Parade of pickets carrying signs protesting capital punishments walked for four hours outside the Don jail in 22-degree cold. Mostly of university age; they dispersed; some crying; moments after the notices of the hangings were posted on the jail door. About 100 pickets took part in the demonstration.]” 

Toronto Star archives, 1962. Toronto Reference LibraryBaldwin Collection. Call Number: tspa_0119750f

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Appropriating “The People”
Commentators and self-styled experts have been quick to jump to hasty conclusions and decree what is driving the present bout of discontent. The giddy enthusiasm of the Trump administration, rightwing DC thinktanks, and many others is palpable. Predictably, the same voices who have consistently demanded Iran’s international isolation, along with the imposition of sanctions, military intervention, and regime change, have rapidly sought to bandwagon the recent expressions of discontent and appropriate them for their own imperial agendas. Such rampant and frankly malevolent opportunism is frustrating to say the least. Within the space of some twenty-four hours, and with only a small number of exceptions, nearly every mainstream Western media outlet has inclined to assimilate legitimate expressions of socioeconomic distress and demands for greater governmental accountability into a question of “regime change.”

Needless to say, these very same individuals and venues have time and again completely ignored the fact that countless strikes and protests from Khuzestan to Tehran, ranging from teachers to retirees, have become a regular occurrence in Iran since President Hassan Rouhani’s 2013 election. The latter’s administration and those sympathetic toward its agenda have sought on many an occasion to scale down levels of securitization and similarly distinguish between those citizens who express legitimate civic grievances and others who seek the system’s overthrow. These may seem like fine distinctions which fail to assuage the liberal conscience, but they are nevertheless immensely important for the institutionalization of legal and mutually recognized channels of civic contestation. These achievements and many others besides (e.g., indications of relaxed policing of “bad hijab” and the commuting of the death penalty for drug smugglers under two kilograms) are not inconsequential or to be belittled. They harbor implications for the lives of thousands if not millions of Iranians.

It is almost as if many of these commentators suffer from a fundamental epistemological blind-spot which ensures such misrecognition, and which makes Iranian state paranoia all the more inevitable. Almost without exception, any time there are protests these commentators and media outlets depict them as a fundamental question of legitimacy about the system in toto; which in turn can only be solved when said system is swept away in its entirety. Indeed, one of the great dividends of the reformist period, which saw seventy percent of the electorate (some twenty million votes) elect Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), was its ability to show that other discourses and political practices exist and are available to citizens. As a process, it was slow and messy, complicated by state parallelism and the disproportionate distribution of powers. It did not always yield immediate alleviation or the much awaited “democratic transition.” However, it nevertheless allowed people to retain a genuine horizon and belief that their circumstances will gradually improve and empowered them as citizens’ harboring agency for change.

The pernicious “all or nothing” outlook, which permeates mainstream media coverage of discontent inside Iran, systematically prevents serious consideration of other grievances at work. These include growing inequality, high food prices, air pollution and environmental degradation, diminished domestic productive capacities, the lack of economic diversification, youth unemployment, and everyday corruption, to list a few. These issues can hardly be analyzed through wishfully-propelled narratives of “regime change” and the facile assumption that what guides the policies of Western powers and their allies is a commitment to democracy. In fact, if these same commentators could escape their caged prejudices they might realize that these very real issues are faced by many countries across the global south and beyond.

These problematic and skewed kinds of mediatized narratives similarly took hold with the emergence of the 2009 Green Movement. As prominent Iran scholars (Hamid Dabashi among them) have declared time and again, that movement is best seen as a civil rights movement which sought to reform the system relying upon the Islamic Republic’s very own constitutional and normative sources of appeal. The protesters aired their grievances to the country’s leaders and political elite, because the overwhelming majority of those who participated were convinced that their protestations might be taken seriously and could possibly provoke a change in state policy. The basis of people’s objections was their conviction that elements within the state had violated the social compact. Their chant was “where is my vote?” This is why they first took to the streets, as the peaceful right to protest is constitutionally guaranteed, not because they sought to tear the system down.

Historical Precedents
The current protests, at least at their inception (they have since been taken up by students around the University of Tehran), are to some extent similar to the provincial ones witnessed under the presidency of the late Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (d. 2017) where in 1991-1992 inflation hit over forty-six percent and the price of basic foodstuffs (above all, bread) skyrocketed. This period also featured the devaluation of the Iranian rial to a twentieth of its value. During Rafsanjani’s second term (1993-1997) there were repeated protests over spikes in prices, first in Mashhad and Shiraz in mid-1992 and then Islamshahr and Qazvin in mid-1995. Each protest eventually diffused and subsided, yet subsequently hampered the Rafsanjani government and forced the ambitious president to concede much of his economic policy agenda (e.g., subsidy reductions, increases in foreign borrowing, etc.) to the traditional right, but also those rightists who took matters of social justice more seriously. In large part, this is because the latter (i.e., the right) saw and continue to see the core of their social base emanating from those poorer, often provincial strata.

On this cursory appraisal we can therefore see different political mobilizations making the most of the sudden burst of protest onto the scene: the poorer, economically frustrated which populate provincial towns and the south of the capital; students and disgruntled members of the professional and salaried middle class whose demands align more closely with the student protests of 1999 and Green Movement of 2009, which were quickly, albeit violently curbed. Whether these groups are simply talking past one another (which seems likely) or prove capable of dialogue and coalition building is an open question. Skepticism is warranted though. Plenty of differences certainly exist with respect to the aforementioned precedents, and history never exactly repeats itself. It should also be said that social media and its repercussions for the nature of social mobilizations complicates matters considerably.

Many of the slogans chanted in this latest round of protests were surely political and relate to frustrations with the status quo. Others, however, demonstrate well how socioeconomic grievances coalesce with expressions of racism and xenophobia. Not exactly news to those following the rise of right-wing populism across Europe and the United States. Such instances do not merely give voice to anger over state support for Hizballah in Lebanon and the Asad regime in Syria, but also anti-Arab discourse and bizarre nostalgia for the days of Reza Shah (i.e., this generation never lived through or experienced the first Pahlavi monarch’s rule); views which have sometimes found themselves cultivated by Western media, but also popular diaspora Persian language TV channels such as Manoto, whose sources have been the subject of much speculation.

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Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, “Misreading Qazvin in Washington: On the Protests in Iran.” Verso blog, January 2, 2018.

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